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ON JUDGING JUDGES
EMBERS of the Association are familiar with the Bar
Primary conducted under the direction of the Judiciary Committee, acting on behalf of the Denver Bar
Association.
As a result of this Primary, seven candidates have been
designated as Bar Association Candidates. It happens that
four belong to one party and three to another. No stronger
proof could be submitted that this endeavor is in fact nonpartisan.
This Primary was secret only to the extent that no one
knew how any member voted. The ballots were removed
from the envelopes without being opened and the envelopes
destroyed.
It was understood that any candidate could examine the
records at the Secretary's office, if he so desired, but that the
number of votes any candidate received would not be made
public. This appeared to be good taste lest some unsuccessful
candidate might be embarrassed.
Recently an anonymous circular was mailed to the members giving a tabulation of the various ballots and the final
votes received by all candidates. It is fair to say that this was
without the knowledge or approval of the Committee, or the
officers of the Association, and was not done by any of the
successful candidates. It is equally fair to say that when information is sent out officially by the Association that its authorship will not be concealed.
The Association owes its thanks to the Committee, consisting of Dudley W. Strickland, Chairman, William E. Hutton, Ira C. Rothgerber, Frank E. Gove, and Richard H. Hart,
as well as to Robert E. More and his assistants who provided
funds for the purpose of informing the public on this important phase of Association work.
We hope for a successful outcome in this election. Very
effective work has been done by the Committee, and the program of the Association should have the loyal support of all
members.
ERNEST L. RHOADS, President.

TRYING TO GET THE P.U.C TO LET YOU
RUN A TRUCK
By Chadwick J. Perry of the Denver Bar*
OTOR trucks, great ships which pass at all hours of
the day and night, have in recent years become an established feature of the life on our roads. They are a
constant sight, and are handling a traffic, small in many individual instances, but very considerable in its aggregate, in
general freight and merchandise, carrying it from point to
point throughout the State. Some are trucks operated by
regular freight lines, such as the line between Denver, Colorado Springs and Pueblo, in type first cousins of the railroads.
There also centers on Denver, and likewise on Colorado
Springs, and Pueblo, and the other cities and towns throughout the State, a network of other lines, infinitely varied in
character. One kind, the community truck line, may be selected as an example: There are, within reasonable motor
vehicle distance of Denver, a large number of small communities, trade headquarters for a surrounding rural territory,
which depend upon Denver as the market for their produce
and as the depot from which they draw their supplies. In
nearly every one of these communities, you will find several
truck men, some of them merely hauling grains to the local
elevator, others doing that and also making more or less regular trips into Denver, bringing in hogs or cattle, milk and
cream, or other produce, and carrying back to the local merchants such things as potatoes, feed, canned goods, flour, salt,
sugar, gasoline, oils, furniture, machinery, hardware, lumber,
and building materials and supplies.
You may have noticed on these trucks some such an inscription as "Colo. P.U.C. No. 273". I was chatting with a
man one day, about various truck lines, when he suddenly
said: "The P.U.C. must be a big outfit. They've got a lot of
trucks on the road." I have laughed over that, but there was
some truth in his idea, because as the situation now stands,
The P.U.C., although it doesn't own them, is in fact the outfit
which has those trucks on the road. They, are operating by
authority of The Public Utilities Commission of The State of
*A paper presented before the Law Club of Denver.
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Colorado, and under its control. The Commission was given
that control, by the Legislature, in 1927. The particular statute is Laws 1927, p. 499, ch. 134; back of that is The Public
Utilities Act proper: Laws 1913, pp. 464-508; C.L. 1921, secs.
2911-2977. Section 1 of the 1927 Act defines a motor vehicle
carrier in these words:
"The term 'motor vehicle carrier' when used in this act means and in-

cludes every corporation, person, firm, . . . operating or managing any motor

vehicle used in serving the public in the business of transporting persons or
property for compensation over any public highway between fixed points or
over established routes, or otherwise, who indiscriminately accept, discharge
and lay down either passengers, freight or express, or who hold themselves
out for such purpose by advertising or otherwise."

Section 2 declares all such motor vehicle carriers to be
public utilities and "to be affected with a public interest and
subject to this act and to the laws of this state, including the
regulation of all rates and charges, now in force or that hereafter may be enacted, pertaining to public utilities." Section 3
prohibits them from operating "except in accordance with the
provisions of this act"; Section 14 makes such outlaw operation
a misdemeanor; and Section 22 provides for injunctive relief
against it, to be had in the Courts at the instance of the Commission. Then, Section 4 provides that no such motor vehicle
carrier shall operate "without first having obtained from the
Commission a certificate declaring that the present or future
public convenience and necessity require, or will require, such
operation", and without paying the road tax established by
the act; and Section 5 gives the Commission power, under its
own rules, to issue such a certificate, either for all or part of
the privilege sought, and to attach to the grant such terms and
conditions as it deems thp public convenience and necessity
require.
In actual practice, the Commission has not been enforcing the strict letter of the word "obtained" in Section 4. If a
motor vehicle carrier has actually applied for a certificate,
the Commission has not been interfering with his operations
while his application is pending, and has not been holding
the fact against him when he comes up for his hearing. But,
as so modified, the situation is that if a motor vehicle carrier,
as defined in the act, operates without having applied to the
Commission for a Certificate, or after one has been denied
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him, he does so in the risk of prosecution under the penalty
sections of the act, or of being proceeded against by way of
injunction, with the shadows, in the background, of contempt
proceedings, the sheriff, and the county jail.
The Act usually is brought to the attention of a truck man
by talk with other truck men, or by his being called to order
by one of the Commission's Inspectors. Then he will come
to you, sometimes asking you at the outset to go ahead and get
him a certificate, sometimes antagonistic to the whole situation, seeking a way out. In either case, the first thing you
must determine is whether, in your opinion, he must comply
with the act. This, of course, depends on whether he comes
within its definition. A few points (without attempting to
cover the field fully) may, however, well be kept in mind:
(1) The Act does not apply to a man hauling exclusively for
himself, a type of operation which you often encounter, as
where a man buys produce, brings it to Denver, and sells it on
his own account. (2) Section 23 of the act expressly excepts
from its operation "the intermittent transportation of farm
produce to market or supplies to the farm by any person chiefly engaged in farming". (3) If your truck man is a "contract
carrier"7 as distinguished from a "common carrier" he is not
subject to the act. You find frequent cases where the truck
man does not serve, or offer to serve, any and all comers, but
instead hauls only for a certain few, under arrangements privately entered into with them, and refuses other trucking.
For example, The Continental Oil Company might arrange
with a man to devote his entire efforts to its hauling to its stations and customers along the Limon Road. Such a truck
man is a contract carrier rather than a common carrier, and
is not subject to the act. But here, as in other cases, it is hard
to fix a dividing line; and this matter of the contract carriers
has been a troublesome one for the Commission, for the claim
of being a contract carrier is constantly put forward, either
honestly or as a dodge, by men seeking to remain outside the
act. And in all these cases, it is very easy for the truck man
to step out of the privileged character and become subject
to the act.
Assuming that you decide that your man is a common
carrier, he is likely to ask you to let him get his neighbors and
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customers to sign a petition to the Commission to grant him a
certificate. It is largely wasted effort to do this, because, although the Commission will allow such petitions to be filed,
it will not act upon them or consider them in evidence. It
will be far better for your man to bring those same neighbors
and customers to his hearing, as witnesses. Your man is also
likely to ask you why he cannot go up and pay his cash over
the counter and get his certificate then and there. This cannot be done. The procedure requires a formal application,
an opportunity to other interested parties to protest it, and a
hearing, before a certificate may be granted. Your task is laid
out for you in the Rules and Regulations of the Commission,
which, with the Act, are printed in pamphlet form and may
be had from the Commission for the asking. I shall attempt,
with some grouping and perhaps somewhat out of exact order,
to outline the bulk of it.
You must first prepare the Application for a Certificate,
together with a number of copies to be used by the Commission for various purposes. It must be typewritten, should be
on legal cap, bound over the top, must be signed by the Applicant and his Attorney and show the address of the Attorney,
and must be verified. The Rules give a tentative outline form
for the Application and provide what it must contain.
You must show the kind of transportation in which you
intend to.engage. (1) You should state fully the commodities
which you intend to haul, for the Commission, as when it permits a man to haul only live stock, may limit you in this respect. (2) You must show the territory and points to be
served. In the case of the community lines, your truck man
will be serving not merely his town, but also certain surroundr
ing territory; the Commission will require you to define that
territory exactly, by some such method as sections, townships
and ranges, or boundaries of highways, streams and county
lines, or distances from the town. And your community truck
man will not merely be hauling to and from Denver; he will
also be doing considerable hauling wholly within his own territory, as well as some hauling to other outside points. I think
it fair to ask for a Certificate which will authorize him to haul
in his own territory, and between that territory and Denver,
and also, so long as the shipment originates at or is destined to
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some point in his territory, to or from any point in Colorado.
(3) You must include a map, blue print or sketch showing
the territory and points to be served, and (as in cases of operation to and from Denver) your route, and showing also all
competing rail and motor carriers. (4) In case your man does
not desire to render some particular service which might be
included in the generality of your proposal, you should show
such limitation in the application, with a view to getting it
into the certificate; otherwise, after the certificate is granted,
your man may be required, as a common carrier, to render
that service against his will.
You must set out in the application your proposed tariff
and time schedule. Many truck men operate only when they
get a load; you do not have to offer a schedule service. If you
do offer one, you must maintain it; and if you offer service
upon call and demand only, you should protect yourself, in
your tariff, with some scheme of minimum charges, to avoid
being required, as a common carrier, to operate at a loss. You
must also show the identity and address of your applicant. If
the applicant is a corporation, the Rules require a very complete set of filings concerning it; and if the applicant is a partnership, you must file the partnership agreement. You must
also show the names of all competing rail and motor carriers;
give a description and state the value of the equipment to be
used in the proposed service, and set out a financial statement
for the applicant himself. Then you must meet the requirements of this portion of Sec. 2946, C.L. 1921:
"Every applicant for a certificate shall file in the office of the commission
such evidence as shall be required by the commission to show that such applicant has received the required consent, franchise, permit, ordinance, -vote or
other authority of the proper county, city and county, municipal or other
public authority."

Except, I think, as against C.L. 1921, Sec. 1272, which
will apply only in rare instances, your chief task in this connection will be to show that the towns and cities through
which you operate either do not require any license of you, or,
if they have such a requirement, that you have complied with
it. A certificate from the mayor, or city or town clerk, usually is sufficient. In the case of Denver, there are two licenses which you may have to obtain: If your man is bring-
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ing in fresh milk and cream, he must have a Milk Vendor's
License; and if he is distributing freight from its original
point of discharge in Denver to other points here, or is running anything in the nature of an intra-city delivery service,
he must have a license for that purpose.
Then, you must give "a statement of all the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to support the public
convenience and necessity, and showing in detail the conditions
requiring a new system or additional service by applicant, including all data necessary to give a complete understanding
of the situation." This may not be easy, because there seem to
be no landmarks by which you can be certain when you have
stated "a cause of action" in "public convenience and necessity". The phrase is a vast, undefined term, probably incapable
of exact definition. I don't know what "public convenience and
necessity" is; in all respect, sometimes I think the Commission
itself couldn't tell you. They have reached the point of conceding that small shipments of live stock can be handled better by trucks than by railroad; beyond that, you can't lay down
many definite lines. You can show that other service does not
exist, or is inadequate; you can show any advantage in the time
of your own service over the railroad service; you can show
any advantage in your rates, and where such advantage does
not exist, you can show that you make "store-door" pick-up
and delivery, while there is no drayage to or from the railroad.
But these are merely "stock" points; you should set out everything which your facts will justify, because anything in the
whole situation may lead the Commission to decide that public convenience and necessity does not exist. I recall.one instance where one Commissioner dissented vigorously from the
grant, because he did not think there would be enough business to support the line; and another (where from what I
learned I think the Commission was justified) in which an
application was denied with these words:
"The evidence shows that the applicant has an interest in one or two
stores and operates a garage. The competition which he affords his possible
customers is such as not to result in amicable relations between them. Moreover, and we say this without any feeling whatever against the applicant, his
general demeanor and attitude as he appeared and testified before the Commission convinces the Commission that he cannot properly and satisfactorily
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serve the public as a common carrier. Frankly, his conduct indicates an offensive and overbearing attitude to those whose opinions happen to differ with
his. After careful consideration of the evidence, the Commission is of the
opinion and so finds that the public convenience and necessity does not require,
but forbids, the operation by the applicant."

A $15.00 docket fee must be paid on filing the Application, and you must then provide the Commission with as many
copies of the Application as it may require, usually, in these
days, ten or more.
You should then immediately take up the matter of the
road tax, which is a tax established by the Act of 1927, and
which is ultimately distributed, 10% to support the Commission, 45% to the State Highway Fund, and 45% among the
counties for highway maintenance. The tax, for vehicles having pneumatic tires, is at the rate of one-half a cent per "ton
mile" on the revenue freight hauled, and for vehicles having
solid tires, five-eighths of a cent per ton mile. The Commission provides blanks on which the carrier must, from day to
day during the month, keep a record of the number of pounds
of revenue freight he has hauled, and the number of miles he
has hauled them. Then, at the end of the month, these figures
are translated into "pound miles" by multiplying the pounds
by the miles, and the aggregate is translated into "ton miles"
by dividing by 2,000. This final figure is the basis of the tax.
The tax reports, for the preceding month, must be verified
and sent to the Commission by the 10th of each month; by the
20th the Commission will send out a bill for the tax; and it
must be paid by the 10th of the following month. After that
date, interest is added at one and one-half percent per month;
the tax becomes a lien on the carrier's personal property and
on all vehicles used in the business; the Commission may distrain or attach; and the carrier faces loss or suspension of his
certificate because of the non-payment.
In the meantime, the Commission will be serving copies
of the Application, by mail, on the boards of county commissioners of the various counties through which your man operates, on the attorneys for any railroads with which you come
in conflict, on, any competing motor vehicle carriers, and on
any other persons it deems necessary, sending with the copies
a letter requesting that the recipient indicate his position with
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regard to the application, in writing in duplicate, within ten
days. Anyone may file a protest against the application right
up to the date of the hearing; competing motor carriers often
will protest; the railroads (under general instructions from
their head offices) always will. Their protests are generally
in the form of a statement that the railroad is rendering adequate service, and that the application does not state grounds
of public convenience and necessity. A reply to a protest is
not usually necessary.
After a reasonable time has elapsed, and as its business
permits, the Commission, either on its own motion or on your
request, will set the application for hearing, and mail notices
of the hearing to you and all interested parties. Most of the
hearings are held in the Commission's Hearing Room, in the
State Office Building, in Denver, but hearings are frequently
held at other points throughout the State. You must appear
at the hearing with your applicant and your witnesses; and
you will find confronting you, from the bench, the three members of the Commission, and across the table, the attorneys for
the protesting parties. (The railroad attorneys religiously
attend all hearings, with their traffic men.) The hearing will
be conducted, though with fewer objections to questions and
evidence, much as a civil trial; you must present testimony to
support your application; and your witnesses will be crossexamined both by the Commission and by the opposing attorneys. Your opponents will be given an opportunity also to
present testimony; and at the close of the hearing the Commission will take the case under advisement.
Possibly in a few days, possibly not until later, the Commission will make a written order in the case, and mail you a
certified copy. If it denies your application, then (except as
against the possibilities of rehearing and review, which are
not within the scope of this paper) you are "out" and it becomes unlawful for your man to continue his common-carrier
operations. If your application is granted, the order will read
somewhat like this:
"It is Therefore Ordered, That the public convenience and necessity
requires the motor vehicle system of the applicant ....

(describing it)

. .

.

and this order shall be held and deemed to be a certificate of public convenience
and necessity therefor.
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"It is Further Ordered, That the applicant shall file tariffs of rates,
rules and regulations and time and distance schedules as required by the Rules
and Regulations of this Commission governing motor vehicle carriers, within
twenty days from the date hereof.
"It is Further Ordered, That the applicant shall operate such motor
vehicle carrier system according to the schedule filed with this Commission
except when prevented from so doing by the Act of God, the public enemy or
unusual or extreme weather conditions; and this order is made subject to
compliance by the applicant with the Rules and Regulations now in force or
to be hereafter adopted by the Commission with respect to motor vehicle carriers and also subject to any future legislative action that may be taken with
respect thereto."

With it, you will receive a bill for a certificate fee (at
A0c per $1,000 of capital invested in the line, with a minimum
of $S.00) ; a notice to equip your trucks with a reflector type
of red tail light; and a notice assigning you your certificate
number and directing the marking of the vehicles in accordance with the Rules. Then you must prepare and file your
formal tariffs and time schedules (printed or typed, in a prescribed form, on letter size paper, 8 2 xllI), and your insurance policies. Copies of the tariff and time schedule must
also be kept at your carrier's offices and depots, or if he has
no depots, must be carried on the trucks.
The insurance policies required, and their amounts, are
specified in the Rules, and consist of a Public Liability and
Property Damage Policy, and a Cargo Liability Policy. Certain specified riders must be attached to them, and they must
be renewed annually on October 1st. The riders are so drawn
as fully to protect the Commission and the public, but they
allow the Insurer to "come back on" the carrier for any losses
paid under the rider, which it would not have had to pay under the policy proper. In the matter of cargo liability, as the
policies are now written, this generally leaves the truck man
in a situation where his risks as a common carrier are not fully
covered by insurance. He can obtain, because of the rider, a
policy satisfactory to the Commission, at a reasonable expense,
but he cannot obtain complete coverage for himself except at
very high rates.
At this point, you will have put your carrier in good
standing with the Commission. He will find himself subject
to public utility and common carrier law, just as fully as the
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railroads; he will have to keep his road tax paid and make
various reports from time to time to the Commission; his rates
and operations will be subject to regulation by the Commission; he cannot cease operations without the consent of the
Commission; and he faces revocation of his certificate if he
violates either the Act or the Commission's orders, rules or
regulations.
Nor can he sell out freely. For one thing, he has no
"paper", like a "title" to an automobile, which he can transfer; the Commission's order is his only certificate. The greater reason is that the Act itself provides:
"Section 6. Any certificate of public convenience and necessity, or rights
obtained under any such certificate held, owned or obtained by any motor
vehicle carrier, may be sold, assigned, leased, encumbered or transferred as
other property, only upon authorization by the Commission."

For this purpose, another application, with contents prescribed by the Rules, must be made, another docket fee
($5.00) must be paid, another opportunity for protests must
be afforded; and another hearing must be held.

JUDGES
By Judge John H. Denison of the Denver Bar*
I
LUTARCH tells of Caesar that he divorced his wife because she had been so compromised that some disbelieved her innocence and that Caesar's wife must be
above suspicion.
One would like to hear her side of the case; whether she
thought that Caesar's wife's husband ought not also to be
above suspicion and whether she had not some claim to his
loyalty and his powerful protection against wrong. But she,
so far as we know, was silent.
Not so with the judges of our courts. They may give a
reason for every judicial act and usually do so. The judges
of our higher courts do so at great length and it is right that
they .should for there are more reasons why they should be
above suspicion than why Mrs. Caesar should be so.
II
There are many kinds of judges, not easily classified. The
categories are not mutually exclusive and admit of no exact
definition.
A great majority of judges are well intentioned. In that
respect they are like a majority of mankind; but the proportion of well intentioned judges is greater, I think, than of men.
It would be strange if it were not so, because they who spend
their lives in consideration of what is right and wrong, not
only ought and usually do know what is right better than ordinary men but become more disposed toward it.
But an occasional Bacon or Jeffreys is found on the bench;
lawyers of great ability but using it for their own profit or
advancement, excusing themselves to themselves by one argu*Formerly Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
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ment or another as necessity may require. Such are rare
among us, but here and there a judge, like Bacon, accepts
favors, immunities, gratuities, presents, promotions, and persuades himself that he is just notwithstanding; or prostitutes
his office for political favor or advancement like Jeffreys.
III
A long time ago a lawyer friend of mine told me of a
conversation he had with one then on the bench in Colorado
about the influences that operated on courts and judges and
the judge said to him that he was influenced by his friendships
and could not help showing favors to his friends. The circumstances were such that he was understood to mean his political friends. I do not think that he meant that he would
deliberately decide a case wrongly for friendship's sake, but
that his discretion would be exerted to that end; perhaps as
illustrated by the following:
A judge once said to me that in a case of political importance to his party, when the question was evenly balanced, he
decided according to his party's advantage. He was putting
it forward as the right thing to do. He would, I think, have
resented an accusation that he "leaned" toward his party, or
favored it judicially, still more that he favored his own advantage. But what else would he be doing? The decision
would favor his party and would be to his and his party's advantage and it would be so because he "leaned" that way
enough to overcome what would otherwise have been an even
balance. He would be biased, in the literal sense of that term.
If one like him but of the opposite party were in his place,
the case would go the other way. The decision then would be
for political reasons, not for legal ones, but his duty is to decide according to law; legal reasons were the only reasons he
could consider if he kept on lines of duty and honor; the law
and his oath permit a judge no other line of argument.
The judge's position, however, was otherwise wrong because it is impossible and absurd.
Impossible: because it is harder to tell whether a question
is evenly balanced than to decide it. It is a more difficult matter to investigate a legal point until by all the pros and cons
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one has shown that the question is even to a scale "within the
estimation of a hair" than to show it to tip one way or the
other. This is so because at last no such question is evenly
balanced. There is a right and wrong to every legal question.
To follow his plan, he must first decide what constitutes an
even balance, and whether the case in hand meets the definition. Seldom does a case involve one question only. Must
they all be evenly balanced, that is, every vital legal question
in the case be so close that the judge cannot make up his mind
which way to decide it? Surely they must, or else there would
be a legal reason for a decision.
Absurd: Suppose there is but one question upon which
the case depends. How can he be sure that his mind is evenly
balanced? When is a question evenly balanced? What does
he mean by "evenly balanced"? Does he mean that he cannot
determine an issue of fact? That is sometimes difficult but
never impossible. He always has a new trial or further evidence on call at his will, and when at last there is an even balance the rule of burden of proof requires a decision in the
negative. Does he mean that he does not know what the law
is? Let him study, read and investigate and ask for further
argument. Does he mean that the authorities are equal in
number and weight, or in such confusion that a clear rule cannot be deduced from them? Then he is free and can decide
as he thinks the law ought to be. And here is the crucial point.
If a judge ever reaches this position, which is not often, is he
absolved from his duty to decide according to law? May he
say "I do not know the law" or "I do not know the application of the law to present facts and so I will decide for political reasons, for the side which I personally favor and for my
own advantage"?
There is, of course, but one answer to such a question and
the judge himself knows it and proves that he knows it by giving other reasons for his decision. He knows that his real reason would be thought wrong and so dares not state it, but if he
states any at all, which he usually does, states reasons which
he intends shall be received by the bar and public as the real
and as sound and sufficient reasons for his decision. Indeed in
every case a judge either advances his true reasons, upon which
the question of even balance is out of the case altogether, or
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he intends to mislead and by giving false reasons conceal the
true one.
It would seem that the proposition in question would lead
to more injustice than is at first obvious, because one who is
disposed to decide one way is inclined to find reasons for so
doing and his eyes will tend to see in every case a doubt and
in every doubt an even balance. The opposite side then, is
fighting with one hand tied. His lawyers will work for their
fees and not with any hope that their arguments will be of
any avail.
To reduce this proposition to its lowest terms, it is thus:
If a judge knows no sufficient legal reason, he may decide for
a political one. This is absurd and it is fortunate for the country that not many judges think it otherwise.
IV
A Bacon has not deliberately determined to do wrong.
I will accept presents from both sides, perhaps he says to himself, but will decide according to law and equity. Even after
Bacon had been found guilty he said he was the justest judge
that had sat for seven ages.
There is a class of judges that take the same position now.
Like their famous predecessor they cannot understand why, if
they decide aright, their conduct should be criticized. Sometimes such a one takes the position that he has received the
gratuity for some reason not connected with the litigation of
the donor, or as a reward for other services; sometimes that
it is received after the decision, intending to provoke the inference that it did not influence him. It seems impossible to
convince him of his sin, or rather that his act was a sin.
A good test of the righteousness of such a stand is to ask
yourself whether you would like to have a judge in your case
accept gratuities from your opponent. Would you like to
have him, pending the case, expecting or even considering the
possibility of such a thing? Would you like to have him,
while the case was pending, contemplating employment by
your opponent after the decision? Would you like to have the
judge accept such employment? No, his position would be
as wrong as that of the political judge and for the same reason.
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V
It was told of the late Mr. Justice Brewer that, shortly
after he went on the supreme bench of the United States, a
great public corporation offered him the position of its chief
counsel at a salary several times greater than that which he
was receiving. The corporation then had a case before the
court which involved rights of enormous value, and, from his
previous decisions, the men in control believed or feared that
he would be against them, so they planned to remove him
from the bench in a lawful manner by employing him themselves. The offer was not accepted and the company lost the
case. Some of the members of the corporation were said to
have attributed their defeat to the, let us say, resentment of
the great jurist at their conduct. That a judge of his character would allow his feelings to govern or influence his decision we cannot believe, and, of course, every lawyer knows
he could not have controlled the other members of the court;
but, if the purpose of the offer was to influence the decision,
it failed.
What, then, would have been wrong with an acceptance
of it? To resign from the bench is not, per se, worthy of criticism. To accept the position of chief counsel for a corporation is not. Perhaps the circumstances were such that Mr.
Justice Brewer might have accepted the position and resigned
before the case was heard, and so have relieved the matter
from all question as to influence on his decision. Indeed, as
the story went, such was the intention. Was there -a good reason why he ought not to do so? We think there was. If he
knew or reasonably suspected the purpose he surely ought not
to accept, because by accepting he would be possibly aiding
in a decision upon improper reasons. But there is a further
reason: Next to having courts worthy of trust, the most important thing is to have the public understand that they are so.
The acceptance of such a position under such circumstances,
though with perfect honesty and honor, would, if the case
should go for the corporation, be misunderstood by a great
number, perhaps a majority of the people of this country. A
vague influence, powerful and wide, though erroneous, would
tend to create and support the suspicion, if not the belief, that
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there was a secret "pull" of some kind from which the court
was not wholly free, and the respect due that tribunal would
be thereby weakened. It is, then, the duty of a judge to avoid
the appearance of evil, as well as evil itself, and the acceptance of the employment, as we have above supposed, would
have violated that duty.
We do not vouch for the truth of the tale about Mr. Justice Brewer, but it accords with his character and well serves
as an illustration of our thesis that a judge ought to be and
ought to keep himself, like Caesar's wife-above suspicion.
It is a height difficult to attain, but any judge can approach
it and most judges do.

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS RECEIVED AT
SUPREME COURT LIBRARY*
Commentaries on the Law of Evidence. Six Volumes. By Burr W. Jones. Second
Edition by James M. Henderson, assisted by the Publishers' Editorial Staff. Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco. This standard work is based upon the original
one-volume work by Professor Jones, published in 1896, which was favorably received not only by the law profession but was adopted by a number of law schools
as a student text book and is now in its second "student edition". This is also the
second edition of the larger work, ably "prepared by James M. Henderson, assisted by the Publishers' Editorial Staff". It is used as much as any other work
in the library on the subject, not excepting the scholarly treatise by Dean Wigmore
which is considered by many as incomparably superior. In this new edition, three
new chapters have been added; one concerns the evidentiary aspect of pleading;
another, experimental evidence, and the third deals with evidence wrongfully obtained. The number of sections is increased from 904 to 2535, thus making the
section headings more specific guides to the cases. Practicing lawyers will find
this work practical and worth-while, especially since it "retains the thread of
Professor Jones' original work", as stated in the preface. It is, therefore, generally considered as authoritive, and the number of cases cited are double that in
the first edition. Also a separate table of cases, for quick reference purposes, is
to be found in the last volume, which contains, in addition, a complete index to
the six volumes.
Legal Periodicals. An important class of legal literature contained in the Supreme
Court Library are the legal periodicals. In these may be found a great mass of
material which is entertaining, instructive and useful in the practice of the law.
The rapidly increasing use of law periodicals in legal research, and the frequency
with which they are being cited, is probably due to the fact that a majority of
the present day law text books fall within that lowly division of books of the class
known as "text book digestsV. There are to be found in the leading periodicals
scholarly articles on legal subjects, by writers of high standing and recognized
ability, in which the principles involved are exhaustively treated, and authorities
cited for the benefit of the reader. Of particular interest to the Colorado-Bar is
"The Rocky Mountain Law Reviewl" edited and published by the University of
Colorado Law School, now in its third volume. This very excellent periodical
contains a variety of legal material, including extended analyses of important
decisions on legal subjects pertinent to this and neighboring jurisdictions. Although "The Rocky Mountain Law ReviewY" is yet in its infancy there is very
reliable evidence here in the library that it is now considered by authorities in
that field as one of the highest ranking legal periodicals.
The value of all legal periodicals shelved in the Supreme Court Library is
greatly increased, and the search for articles dealing with any particular field of
aEwToR's Norz: It is sometimes convenient to know what recent texts, reports, etc., are available at
the Supreme Court Library, and Mr. Fred Y. Holland, of the Denver Bar, Librarian of the Supreme Court
Library, has kindly consented to supply Dicta monthly with brief notes as to new books received. It is
hoped this service may be of service to our readers.
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the law desired is made comparatively simple, by an up-to-date set of indices in five
bound volumes, which are supplemented by quarterly advance sheets, as follows:
"Index to Legal Periodicals",by Leonard A. Jones, complete thru 1897, two volumes;
Frank E. Chipman, 1898-1926, three volumes. In addition the Library contains
the new "Legal PeriodicalDigest", three volumes to date, published by the Commerce Clearing House, Inc., and receives the current numbers. As stated in the
preface, it is "A monthly digest of current articles involving research in alI law
periodicals published in the English language". The digest to law periodicals is
a valuable and useful adjunct to this class of material. Original articles may be
found in periodicals shelved in the library, or may be obtained from the publishers
if desired. Legal periodicals and current numbers (complete files except as indicated) on file in the Supreme Court Library are as follows: American Law
Register; American Law Review; The Albany Law Journal; American Bar Association Journals; The American Law School Review (current numbers) ; Central Law Journal; Columbia Law Review; Commercial Law League Journal
(1927 to date) ; Co pp's Land Owner (1874 to 1889) ; Criminal Law Magazine and
Reporter; Cornell Law Quarterly; Denver Bar Association Journal; Dicta; The
Green Bag; Harvard Law Review; Illinois Law Review; The Insurance Law
Journal; International Labor Review; Law Quarterly Review (published in England) ; Journal of American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Journal
of the American Judicature Society (current numbers) ; Law Notes; Michigan
Law Review; Pacific Coast Law Journal; Pennsylvania Law Review; State Government; Workmen's Compensation Law Journal, and Yale Law Journal (volumes 25 to date).

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrrmO's NO .- It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

CORPORATIONS--ANNUAL REPORT-LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS

No. 12608-Bergren et al vs. Valentine Hardware Company-Decided September 15, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiffsues the .defendants as directors of The
Fairview Mining Company. There appears to be no serious
dispute as to the amount of the debt owed by the company,
the questions being (1) as to the sufficiency of the annual report, (2) the right of a stock-holder who is a creditor to sue
the directors, and (3) the rights of an assignee to sue when the
assignment is for collection purposes only. The evidence
showed that the annual report did not comply with the requirements of the statute. Judgment was had for the plaintiff
in the trial court, and the defendant alleged error.
Held.-(1) The contents of annual reports must comply
with the requirements of the statute. "The statute means exactly what it says, and should, if officers and directors hope to
escape a liability for corporate debts, be strictly followed."
(2) There is no distinction between creditors who are,
and creditors who are not stockholders.
(3) An assignment, even though for collection purposes
only, is good.
Judgment Affirmed.
DAMAGES-AWARD BY JURY-No. 12247-Tramway Corpor-

ation vs. A. K. Ancker-Decided September 15, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff,Ancker, obtained a judgment on a verdict for $151.78 against the defendant. The evidence was
conflicting, and though the plaintiff claimed $250 as depreciation to his car in addition to the costs for repair, the verdict
was only for the costs for repair. Defendant alleged error in
the admission of evidence of depreciation.
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Held.-The defendant's rights were not prejudiced by
the admission of evidence of depreciation insofar as the verdict only awarded repair charges. The Court refused to decide as to whether or not the admission of evidence of depreciation constitutes error.
The verdict was based on conflicting testimony and it will
not be disturbed.
Judgment Affirmed.
JUDGEs-No. 126.5S-Winters vs. Pacheco et al-Decided September 22, 1930.
Facts.-At a school election for one of the districts in
Conejos County, Winters was named by the election judges
as Treasurer of the District with 66 votes. Winter's opponent,
one Pacheco was given 65 votes. Pacheco started proceedings
in the County Court to contest the election, and the Court
found that there was one illegible ballot which had been
wrongly counted by the election judges as a vote for Winters.
The Court thereupon held that the election was a tie, and ordered a special election. There was no doubt but that the
ballot in question was illegible. Winters makes two allegations of error; (1) The opening of the ballot box without the
proper foundation, and (2) The determination that the ballot
in question was undecipherable.
Held.-(1) "Ballot boxes should not be ordered opened
until some positive proof is offered to show that the election
returns are not justified by the ballots in the ballot boxes, but
when this preliminary proof is offered, it would be gross abuse
of discretion for a court to deny contestor the right to substantiate his cause by documentary evidence."
(2) The findings of the elections judges are not binding
upon the Court. "To give the judges of elections the unlimited power for which the contestee contends would force
the courts and judges thereof to absolutely shut their eyes to
the most convincing evidence, and follow blindly the lead of
election judges. In matters of documentary evidence, we have
repeatedly held that the findings of the lower courts are not
ELECTIONS-EECTION
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conclusive upon us because, -'We are in as good a position
to judge such evidence as the trial court'."
Judgment Affirmed.
FRAUD-VITIATES ENTIRE TRANSACTION-No. 12648-Mur-

ray vs. Ready et al-DecidedSeptember 22, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiff came into possession of a note and
mortgage from her sister at a time when her sister, since deceased, was no longer in her right mind. As a part of the
same transaction, the plaintiff obtained all of her sister's property. In a prior suit, the administrator of the estate sued the
Plaintiff to quiet title to a parcel of land which she also procured. At that trial it was found that the plaintiff obtained
the deed to the property without adequate compensation and
while her sister was mentally incompetent. The plaintiff now
seeks to collect the proceeds from a note and mortgage which
were transferred at the same time as the parcel of land which
was involved in the prior suit. Defendant, Ready, paid the
money into court and the administrator was thereupon made
a party defendant. The sole question is whether the judgment
in the former suit determined the vital question presented in
the present suit.
Held.-"It appearing, therefore, that the giving of the
deed involved in the former suit and the giving of the assignment involved in this suit occurred at the same time and place
as component parts of the same transaction, the same infirmity
attaches to and vitiates the assignment that attached to and
vitiated the deed."
Judgment Affirmed.
Kingdom of Gilpin
Mines vs. McNeill-Decided September 15, 1930.
Facts.-Action by McNeill to foreclose an equitable lien
on certain mining property and real estate belonging to the
company. The evidence disclosed that the plaintiff had originally had a mechanics lien on the premises before the property was owned by the company, but while it was owned by
REAL PROPERTY-LIENS--No. 12239 -
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one Bierbaum who was the promotor of the company. The
plaintiff failed to foreclose on his mechanics lien within the
statutory time, because of a new agreement made between him
and Bierbaum which took the place of the former lien. This
latter agreement, as established by oral testimony and letters,
is the one upon which this suit was maintained. To the judgment for foreclosure and sale, the defendant sets out three
main allegations of error; (1) In overruling the demurrer to
the complaint, (2) In finding and decreeing a lien on the property, and (3) That the findings are contrary to the law and
the evidence.
Held.-Defendants interposed a general demurrer to
plaintiff's complaint and they now argue that McNeill's lien
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds. "The statute of frauds
is a privilege of which a defendant may or may not avail himself, at his option. If relied upon, it must be specially pleaded
and raised by demurrer or answer, as the case may be, and to
insure consideration by this court, must also be covered by an
appropriate reference in the assignments of error."
Defendant's contention that the company had no notice
of this second lien is also unsound. The company was notified
of the second lien insofar as the president was the one who
made it, even though the proviso in the deed to the company
did not mention it.
Judgment Affirmed.
REAL PROPERTY-SALES OF-FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS

-No 1261 1-Troutman vs. Stiles-Decided June 30, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff sought to recover $9600. from the
defendant by virtue of certain alleged fraudulent representations by the defendant. The amended complaint alleged the
representations made by the defendant and set forth the terms
of the contract. Among other things, the contract stated, "We
each have inspected each other's property and are dealing
solely on our own judgment and not upon any representations
that have been made to us, and have carefully read this contract before signing." It appeared that the plaintiff went upon the defendant's land, but that he did not examine it thor-
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oughly. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, whereupon the plaintiff alleged error.
Held.-It seems well settled that "Where the parties deal
upon equal terms, one who has failed to avail himself of means
of knowledge readily within his reach cannot as a rule complain of the other party's representations."
Judgment Affirmed.
REAL PROPERTY-TITLES-BY ADVERSE POSSESSION-TACK-

ING-No. 12267-Lundquist vs. Disenmann-DecidedJune
30, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiffsued to recover possession of a strip of
eight feet of land claimed by the defendant. Plaintiff contended that the strip in dispute belonged to his Lot 40, and
defendant contended that it belonged to her adjoining Lot 39.
Upon trial the Court found that the plaintiff had title to 4.88
feet of the disputed strip by virtue of his deed, and that as to
the remaining 3.12 feet the plaintiff had title by adverse possession. The evidence showed that the plaintiff and his family
had continuously occupied the eight foot strip for a period of
twenty-four years prior to the commencement of this action.
The defendant contended that the plaintiff's possession was
not continuous, but was interrupted by virtue of the fact that
it was first held by the plaintiff, then conveyed to his wife and
upon her decease intestate one-half thereof descended to each
the plaintiff and his son. This appears to be the only plausible
objection by the defendant to the judgment below.
Held.-"The law is firmly established in the courts of
this country almost without exception * * * that where, as
here, there is privity of title or estate the possession of successive disseizors may be joined or tacked together so as to be
regarded as continuous possession."
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AWARDS-APPEAL FROM-No.

12596-Tyler et al vs. Hagerman et al.-DecidedSeptember 22, 1930.
Facts.-Hagerman was injured on September 27, 1926.
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On April 8, 1927, claim for compensation was properly made,
and a hearing thereon having been had, the referee denied the
claimant's right to compensation. After two hearings which
were not made pursuant to application by the claimant, but
upon the motion of the Commission, without notice, on December 19, 1928, the Commission affirmed the award of the
referee. No petition for review was filed by the claimant
within the 10 day period allowed under the statute, but on
December 31, the claimant's attorney asked, by letter, for an
extension of time. On January 23, 1929 (25 days after the
statutory period had elapsed), the Commission granted an extension until January 31. This time was extended, pursuant
to request, until February 10. On February 11, an application for review was filed, and on February 19, the Commission granted the application. On April 3, a hearing was held
at which the attorney for the insurer objected to any admission of testimony. However, on May 7, 1929, the Commission
awarded the claimant 30% partial permanent disability.
Held.-"Two methods of reviewing an award of the Industrial Commission are provided by the statute: First (Sec.
4471 C.L. '21), upon petition of any party in interest dissatisfied therewith which must be filed within ten days after the
entry of any referee's order or award of the Commission unless further time is granted by the referee or the Commission
within said ten days, and, unless so filed, said order or award
shall be final, and second (Sec. 4484 C. L. '21), by the Commission upon its own motion on the ground of error, mistake
or a change of conditions and 'after notice of hearings to the
parties interested, * *
Here, there had been no notice given.
Judgment Reversed.
HOLDER-NO. 12287-Newmyer vs. Tax Service Corporation,Board of County Commissioners of the County of Saguache, and Wilson P.
Williams, as County Treasurer.-DecidedJune 2, 1930.
Facts.-The parties appear as below: Dacre Dunn failed
to pay taxes on his land for the years 1914, 1915, 1916 and
1919, and through oversight the County Treasurer did not
TAx SALE-REDEMPTION BY FEE
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offer it for sale. Subsequent to 1919, Mr. Newmyer acquired
title. In 1923 the failure to sell for the 1919 taxes was discovered, and on December 17, 1923, land was sold to Mrs.
Newmyer. On February 16, 1925, the land was sold for the
taxes of 1914 to the Tax Service Corporation. Thereafter
the taxes for 1915, 1916, 1923 and 1924 were paid in full by
the corporation.
On October 21, 1925, Mrs. Newmyer sold her tax certificate for the 1919 taxes, and five days later she accepted a
deed from her husband conveying the fee to tle property.
Contending that her purchase of the 1919 tax "cut out" or
discharged the lien for the taxes of 1914, 1915, and 1916,
plaintiff prosecuted this action to redeem without paying the
taxes for those years.
Three questions were raised: 1. The validity of the
sale for the 1919 tax; 2. The admissibility of evidence to
show cause why the date of the sale did not conform to the
statute; 3. The right of the plaintiff to amend her complaint
to allege that cause. If, however, Mrs. Newmyer is in no
position to claim any rights or make any defense based upon
that sale, these assignments of error require no consideration.
From judgment for the defendant, plaintiff alleges error.
Held.-The interest that the purchaser of lands at a tax
sale acquires is in the absence of a statute to the contrary freed
from the liability for delinquent taxes of previous years. This
is true as between purchasers in tax sales, but where the owner
of the fee is involved the question "is simply this-if the land
of a delinquent be sold to various purchasers for the unpaid
taxes of a series of years, may the owner slip from the entire
burden by merely redeeming from the last sale? If so, here
is indeed a new way to pay old debts."
Judgment Affirmed.
WATER RIGHTS-ABANDONMENT-EVIDENCE OF-No. 12085

-Klug and The Peters Trust Company vs. Henrylyn Irrigation District, Ireland, and Box Elder Land CompanyDecided June 30,1930.
Facts.-Klug had obtained a decree awarding him 500
cubic feet of water per second to supply approximately 1300
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acres of his land and 80 cubic feet per second to supply 640
acres of land. This decree awarded flood water only, and for
the purposes of obtaining the benefits of the decree Klug was
given the right to build three reservoirs. Of these but one
was constructed. Klug built a reservoir which had a capacity
of from 10 to 100 cubic feet per second. At the trial those
parties adverse to Klug were sustained by the lower Court in
their allegation of abandonment and in accordance with this
finding, the priority decree was held for naught, and Klug
was awarded 90 cubic feet per second. The facts supporting
abandonment were that Klug, by the construction of his reservoir, had made permanently impossible the use of the water
awarded him in his priority decree. Klug alleged error.
Held.-We can conceive of no higher evidence of abandonment than this. It is non-user coupled with the presumption of permanence and proof of intent more persuasive than
any oral declaration could be. It is comparable to proof of a
man's abandonment of his right hand by voluntarily cutting
it off."
"Briefly stated this resolves itself into a simple case of
findings of fact based upon conflicting evidence, which findings a fundamental rule requires us to uphold."
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-EMPLOYER

CONSTRUED--No.

12598-Devereux et al vs. The Industrial Commission, and
Wohlcke et al.-Decided June 30, 1930.
Facts.-The Industrial Commission awarded compensation to the plaintiffs, which award was affirmed by the District Court. The plaintiffs are the widow and daughter of
one Fred J. Wohlcke who was killed by a falling rock in a
mine near Georgetown. Several months before Wohlcke met
his death, he and his partner had sold the mine in which the
accident occurred under a bond and lease to the defendants.
There was a provision in the lease which gave Wohlcke and
his partners a contract for "* * * two hundred feet at $12.50
per foot * * *" It was while Wohlcke was pursuing this
contract, and after some money had been paid him thereon,
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that he was killed. The defendants contended that they were
not "operating or engaged in or conducting any business by
leasing or contracting out any part or all of the work thereof
to any lessee, sub-lessee, contractor, or sub-contractor," and
that they were accordingly not an employer within the meaning of the statute and that they were therefore not liable as
such.
Held.-"The Devereuxs were engaged in the operation
of a mining company by 'contracting out' part of the work.
* * * It is immaterial that the Devereuxs did not own the
property and had not perfected an interest therein at the time
of Wohlcke's death.'
Judgment Affirmed.
oF-NO. 12482-Cartiervs. Cartier-Decided September 29,1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff obtained a divorce in the Lower Court
to which no Motion to set aside was ever filed. At the expiration of six months defendant made a motion for a final decree,
which was granted over the express objection of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff asks for reversal.
Held.-The Session, Laws of 1929 provide that a final
decree shall be granted if such final decree is provided for in
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Act is,
however, inoperative if the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law do not contain the specific terms and provisions which
are required by it.
The Court refuses to determine the constitutionality of
the 1929 Statute.
Judgment reversed with directions to vacate.
DIVORCE-DECREE
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CHILD WELFARE
Dicta, in line with its policy of being the Bar's Big Brother, strives to bring novel and important points of law to the
attention of its readers and therefore passes along to them the
following interesting information supplied by a "Constant
Reader", to-wit: "Angry and disgusted children, if poor,
should be warned that the Legislature has made provision for
the 'apprenticeship of indignant children' (C. L. of Colo.
1921, top of page 2275)."
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